Coordination in the Fight Against Collusion

Patrick Rey, Elisabetta Iossa, Simon Loertscher and Leslie Marx

No 23-1441, TSE Working Papers from Toulouse School of Economics (TSE)

Abstract: While antitrust authorities strive to detect, prosecute, and thereby deter collusive conduct, entities harmed by that conduct are also advised to pursue their own strategies to deter collusion. The implications of such delegation of deterrence have largely been ignored, however. In a procurement context, we find that buyers may prefer to accommodate rather than deter collusion among their suppliers. We also show that a multi-market buyer, such as a centralized procurement authority, may optimally deter collusion when multiple independent buyers would not, consistent with the view that “large” buyers are less susceptible to collusion.

Keywords: Collusion; Cartel; Auction; Procurement; Reserves; Sustainability and initiation of collusion; Coordinated effects (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 D82 H57 L41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023-06-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-cta, nep-des, nep-gth, nep-ind, nep-law, nep-mic and nep-reg
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Journal Article: Coordination in the Fight against Collusion (2024)
Working Paper: Coordination in the fight against collusion (2024)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tse:wpaper:128130

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