Indirect Reciprocity and Strategic Reputation Building in an Experimental Helping Game

Dirk Engelmann and Urs Fischbacher

No 34, TWI Research Paper Series from Thurgauer Wirtschaftsinstitut, Universität Konstanz

Abstract: We study indirect reciprocity and strategic reputation building in an experimental helping game. At any time only half of the subjects can build a reputation. This allows us to study both pure indirect reciprocity that is not contaminated by strategic reputation building and the impact of incentives for strategic reputation building on the helping rate. We find that pure indirect reciprocity exists, but also that the helping decisions are substantially a!ected by strategic considerations. We find that the behavioral pattern can best be captured by non-selfish preferences as assumed by reciprocity models. Finally, we find that strategic do better than non-strategic players and non-reciprocal do better than reciprocal players, casting doubt on previously proposed evolutionary explanations for indirect reciprocity.

Keywords: indirect reciprocity; reputation; experimental economics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-evo, nep-exp, nep-gth and nep-soc
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (12)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Indirect reciprocity and strategic reputation building in an experimental helping game (2009)
Working Paper: Indirect Reciprocity and Strategic Reputation Building in an Experimental Helping Game (2003)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:twi:respas:0034

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