Multiple Equilibria in Tullock Contests

Subhasish Chowdhury and Roman Sheremeta

No 14, University of East Anglia Applied and Financial Economics Working Paper Series from School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK.

Abstract: We find the sufficient conditions for the existence of multiple equilibria in Tullock-type contests and show that asymmetric equilibria may arise even under symmetric prize and cost structures. We also identify contests in the literature where multiple equilibria exist under reasonably weak conditions.

Keywords: rent-seeking; contest; asymmetric equilibrium; multiple equilibria (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C62 C72 D72 D74 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-09-17
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-gth
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Multiple equilibria in Tullock contests (2011)
Working Paper: Multiple Equilibria in Tullock Contests (2011)
Working Paper: Multiple equilibria in Tullock contests (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:uea:aepppr:2010_14

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