Economic Theories of Settlement Bargaining

Andrew Daughety and Jennifer Reinganum ()

No 508, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers from Vanderbilt University Department of Economics

Abstract: We briefly review two basic models of settlement bargaining based on concepts from information economics and game theory. We then discuss how these models have been generalized to address issues that arise when there are more than two litigants with related cases. Linkages between cases can arise due to exogenous factors such as correlated culpability or damages, or they can be generated by discretionary choices on the part of the litigants themselves or by legal doctrine and rules of procedure.

Keywords: Multiple litigants; externalities; asymmetric information (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D82 K41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth, nep-hpe and nep-law
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (24)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.accessecon.com/pubs/VUECON/vu05-w08.pdf First version, 2005 (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:van:wpaper:0508

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers from Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by John P. Conley ().