Why Larger Lenders obtain Higher Returns: Evidence from Sovereign Syndicated Loans

Issam Hallak and Paul Schure ()

No 802, Department Discussion Papers from Department of Economics, University of Victoria

Abstract: Lenders that fund larger shares of a syndicated loan typically receive larger percentage upfront fees than smaller lenders. This paper studies sovereign syndicated loan contracts in the period 1982-2006 to explore this fact. In our dataset of 288 contracts large lenders obtain on average an 8.5 percent higher return on their funds than small lenders who join the syndicate. Our analysis shows that the return premium large lenders receive is positively affected by anticipated future liquidity problems of the borrower and by the number of banks. Our analysis also reveals that the return premium is not used to control the number of banks that join the syndicate. We interpret our findings as indicating that the fee structure on syndicated loans incorporates anticipated costs associated with a borrower illiquidity, notably the costs of coordinating the workout and providing liquidity insurance, but that the fee structure does not serve the additional purpose of curbing these costs by reducing the number of lenders in the syndicate.

Keywords: Financial Intermediation; Syndicated loans; Sovereign debt; Relationship Lending; Debt Renegotiation; Illiquidity; Number of Lenders (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F34 G21 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 38 pages
Date: 2008-12-31
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ban
Note: ISSN 1914-2838
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Why Larger Lenders Obtain Higher Returns: Evidence from Sovereign Syndicated Loans (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:vic:vicddp:0802

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