Migrant Smuggling

Yuji Tamura

The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) from University of Warwick, Department of Economics

Abstract: We analyze the migrant smuggling market where smugglers differ in their capacities to exploit their clients' labor in the destination. We show that when exploitation capacities are private information, the equilibrium may be characterized by adverse selection. In such a case, policies that diminish the availability of smuggling services to potential migrants inevitably raise the mean exploitation of smuggled labor.

Keywords: migrant smuggling; migrant exploitation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 F22 J61 K42 L15 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 47 pages
Date: 2007
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-law and nep-reg
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Migrant smuggling (2010)
Working Paper: Migrant Smuggling (2007)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wrk:warwec:791

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