 HELPING AND SABOTAGING IN TOURNAMENTSInternational Game Theory Review (IGTR), 2005, vol. 07, issue 02, 211-228 Abstract: A two-stage, two-person tournament is discussed, in which each player can influence the other one at the first stage by choosing help, sabotage or no action. At the second stage, the players choose effort to win the tournament. Helping and sabotaging have two effects — they influence the likelihood of winning (likelihood effect) and they determine the equilibrium efforts and, therefore, effort costs (cost effect). Depending on the interplay of the two effects, diverse types of equilibria are possible. In particular, if the cost effect dominates the likelihood effect (i.e., both players concentrate on minimizing effort costs), two asymmetric equilibria will coexist in which one player helps his opponent, whereas the other one chooses sabotage and vice versa. Keywords: Cost effect; likelihood effect; tournament; JEL classification code: J31; JEL classification code: J33; JEL classification code: M5 (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:07:y:2005:i:02:n:s0219198905000491 Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from DOI: 10.1142/S0219198905000491 Access Statistics for this article International Game Theory Review (IGTR) is currently edited by David W K Yeung More articles in International Game Theory Review (IGTR) from World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd. |
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