A Framed Field Experiment on Collective Enforcement Mechanisms with Ethiopian Farmers

Anke Reichhuber, Eva Camacho Cuena () and Till Requate ()

No 2008-11, Economics Working Papers from Christian-Albrechts-University of Kiel, Department of Economics

Abstract: We present the results of a framed field experiment with Ethiopian farmers that use the mountain rain forest as a common pool resource. Harvesting honey causes damage to the forest, and open access leads to overharvesting. We test different mechanisms for mitigating excessive harvesting: a collective tax with low and high tax rates, and a tax/subsidy system. We find that the high-tax scheme works best in inducing the desired level of harvesting while the tax-subsidy scheme may trigger tacit collusion. Via a panel data analysis we further investigate which variables influence the subjects? decisions during the treatments.

Keywords: common pool resources; collective tax; framed field experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-agr, nep-dev, nep-env, nep-exp and nep-pbe
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Journal Article: A framed field experiment on collective enforcement mechanisms with Ethiopian farmers (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:cauewp:7372

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