Civic capital and support for the welfare state

Roy Cerqueti, Fabio Sabatini and Marco Ventura

EconStor Preprints from ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics

Abstract: We model how the interplay between tax surveillance institutions and civic capital shapes taxpayers' support for welfare state. We show that, when tax surveillance is tight, rational civic-minded individuals express greater support for welfare spending than uncivic ones. We provide empirical evidence of these preferences using data from Italy, a country that has long posed a puzzle for public economists for its limited civic capital and large welfare state.

Keywords: welfare state; redistribution; tax surveillance; trust; civic capital; social capital (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pbe and nep-soc
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Civic capital and support for the welfare state (2019)
Working Paper: Civic capital and support for the welfare state (2017)
Working Paper: Civic capital and support for the welfare state (2017)
Working Paper: Civic capital and support for the welfare state (2016)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:esprep:171243

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