Selection wages and discrimination

Ekkehart Schlicht

No 2009-35, Economics Discussion Papers from Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel)

Abstract: Applicants for any given job are more or less suited to fill it, and the firm will select the best among them. Increasing the wage offer attracts more applicants and makes it possible to raise the hiring standard and improve the productivity of the staff. Wages that optimize on the trade-off between the wage level and the productivity of the workforce are known as selection wages. As men react more strongly to wage differ¬entials than females, the trade-off is more pronounced for men and a profitmaximizing firm will offer a higher wage for men than for women in equilibrium.

Keywords: Discrimination; selection wages; efficiency wages; hiring standards; monopsony; employment criteria; wage posting; Reder competition (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: B54 D13 D42 J31 J7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-lab
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https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/27733/1/606258167.PDF (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Selection wages and discrimination (2010)
Working Paper: Selection Wages and Discrimination (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:ifwedp:200935

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