Minority Voting and Public Project Provision

Hans Gersbach

No 2007-20, Economics Discussion Papers from Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel)

Abstract: We propose a two-stage process called minority voting to allocate public projects in a polity. In the first period, a society decides by a simple majority decision whether to provide the public project. If the proposal in the first period is rejected, the process ends. Otherwise the process continues, but only the members of the minority keep agenda and voting rights for the second stage, in which the financing scheme is determined. In the second stage, the unanimity rule or the simple majority rule is applied. We provide a first round of relative welfare comparisons between minority voting and simple majority voting and outline our research program.

Keywords: democratic constitutions; minority voting; public projects (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D60 D72 H40 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-pbe, nep-ppm and nep-pub
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.economics-ejournal.org/economics/discussionpapers/2007-20
https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/17943/1/dp2007-20.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Minority voting and public project provision (2009)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:ifwedp:5567

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Economics Discussion Papers from Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel) Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics (econstor@zbw-workspace.eu).