Approximate truth of perfectness: An experimental test

Siegfried Berninghaus, Werner Güth () and King King Li

No 41, Working Paper Series in Economics from Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT), Department of Economics and Management

Abstract: Approximate truth refers to the principle that border cases should be analyzed by solving generic cases and solving border cases as limits of generic ones (Brennan et al., 2008). Our study experimentally explores whether this conceptual principle is also behaviorally appealing. To do so, we focus on perfectness (Selten, 1975) and use his example game with (no) multiplicity of (perfect) equilibria. Distinguishing three uniform perturbation levels, we check for monotonicity (all players react monotonically to the perturbation level) and then explore the behavioral relevance of approximate truth.

Keywords: experimental games; trembling hand perfectness; perturbed strategies (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 C72 C91 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp, nep-gth and nep-hpe
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Working Paper: Approximate Truth of Perfectness - An Experimental Test - (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:kitwps:41

DOI: 10.5445/IR/1000028695

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