Monkey see, monkey do: Truth-telling in matching algorithms and the manipulation of others

Pablo Guillen and Rustamdjan Hakimov

Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Behavior from WZB Berlin Social Science Center

Abstract: We test the effect of the amount of information on the strategies played by others in the theoretically strategy-proof Top Trading Cycles (TTC) mechanism. We find that providing limited information on the strategies played by others has a negative and significant effect in truth-telling rates relative to full or no information about others' strategies. Subjects report truthfully more often when either full information or no information on the strategies played by others is available. Our results have potentially important implications for the design of markets based on strategy-proof matching algorithms.

Keywords: school choice; top trading cycles; strategy-proofness (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D79 D80 I20 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta, nep-exp, nep-ger and nep-gth
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:wzbmbh:spii2014202

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