Social image concerns and welfare take-up

Jana Friedrichsen, Tobias König and Renke Schmacker

Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Behavior from WZB Berlin Social Science Center

Abstract: Using a laboratory experiment, we present first evidence that social image concerns causally reduce the take-up of an individually beneficial transfer. Our design manipulates the informativeness of the take-up decision by varying whether transfer eligibility is based on ability or luck, and how the transfer is financed. We find that subjects avoid the inference both of being low-skilled (ability stigma) and of being willing to live of others (free-rider stigma). Using a placebo treatment, we exclude other explanations for the observed stigma effects. Although stigma reduces take-up, elicitation of political preferences reveals that only a minority of "taxpayers" vote for the public transfer.

Keywords: stigma; signaling; redistribution; non take-up; welfare program (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D03 H31 I38 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018, Revised 2018
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (18)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Social image concerns and welfare take-up (2018)
Journal Article: Social image concerns and welfare take-up (2018)
Working Paper: Social Image Concerns and Welfare Take-Up (2018)
Working Paper: Social Image Concerns and Welfare Take-Up (2018)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:wzbmbh:spii2016208r

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