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Social norms and preferences for generosity are domain dependent

Hande Erkut

Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Behavior from WZB Berlin Social Science Center

Abstract: Experimental research on generosity has focused predominantly on behavior in the monetary domain, although many real life decisions take place in the non-monetary domain. Investigating generosity preferences in the non-monetary domain is important to understand a large class of situations ranging from effort provision at work to individual CO2 emissions. This study explores whether generosity differs between the monetary and non-monetary domains and if so why. The results show that preferences for generosity are different between domains and that different social norms of allocation can explain the greater levels of generosity in the non-monetary compared to the monetary domain.

Keywords: generosity; dictator game; non-monetary domain; GARP; social norms (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D03 D64 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe and nep-exp
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Journal Article: Social norms and preferences for generosity are domain dependent (2022) Downloads
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:wzbmbh:spii2018207

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