Employee recognition and performance: A field experiment

Christiane Bradler, Robert Dur, Susanne Neckermann and Arjan Non

No 13-017, ZEW Discussion Papers from ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research

Abstract: This paper reports the results from a controlled field experiment designed to investigate the causal effect of public recognition on employee performance. We hired more than 300 employees to work on a three-hour data-entry task. In a random sample of work groups, workers unexpectedly received recognition after two hours of work. We find that recognition increases subsequent performance substantially, and particularly so when recognition is exclusively provided to the best performers. Remarkably, workers who did not receive recognition are mainly responsible for this performance increase. This result is consistent with workers having a preference for conformity.

Keywords: employee motivation; recognition; reciprocity; conformity; field experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C93 M52 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-exp, nep-hrm, nep-lab and nep-lma
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (45)

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https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/72467/1/742553086.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Employee Recognition and Performance: A Field Experiment (2014)
Working Paper: Employee Recognition and Performance: A Field Experiment (2013)
Working Paper: Employee Recognition and Performance: A Field Experiment (2013)
Working Paper: Employee recognition and performance: A field experiment (2013)
Working Paper: Employee recognition and performance: A field experiment (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:zewdip:13017

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