Participation costs for responders can reduce rejection rates in ultimatum bargaining

Philipp Wichardt, Daniel Schunk and Patrick Schmitz

No 398, IEW - Working Papers from Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich

Abstract: This paper reports data from an ultimatum mini-game in which responders first had to choose whether or not to participate. Participation was costly, but the participation cost was smaller than the minimum payoff that a responder could guarantee himself in the ultimatum game. Compared to a standard treatment, we find that the rejection rate of unfavorable offers is significantly reduced when participation is costly. A possible explanation based on cognitive dissonance is offered.

Keywords: Cognitive dissonance; Participation costs; Sunk costs; Ultimatum game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D63 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe and nep-exp
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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https://www.zora.uzh.ch/id/eprint/52351/1/iewwp398.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Participation costs for responders can reduce rejection rates in ultimatum bargaining (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zur:iewwpx:398

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