Are People Conditionally Cooperative? Evidence from a Public Goods Experiment
Simon Gaechter and
Ernst Fehr ()
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Simon Gächter ()
No 16, IEW - Working Papers from Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich
We investigate to what extent contribution decisions to a public good depend on the contributions of others. We employ a novel experimental technique that allows us to elicit people's willingness to be conditionally cooperative, i.e., to contribute more to the public good the more the other beneficiaries contribute. We find that about a third of subjects' contribution schedules is characterized by complete free-riding. However, a majority of 50 percent of the subjects displays conditional cooperation. Our results can explain why in most repeated public goods experiments subjects initially cooperate while towards the final periods cooperation declines to very low levels.
Keywords: voluntary contributions; conditional cooperation; free riding; strategy-method; experiments (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H41 D64 D74 C91 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp, nep-ind, nep-pbe and nep-pub
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations View citations in EconPapers (30) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
Journal Article: Are people conditionally cooperative? Evidence from a public goods experiment (2001)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zur:iewwpx:016
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in IEW - Working Papers from Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich Contact information at EDIRC.
Series data maintained by Marita Kieser ().