Details about Benjamin A Brooks

Homepage:	http://www.benjaminbrooks.net/
Postal address:	Kenneth C. Griffin Department of Economics University of Chicago 1126 E. 59th Street, Chicago, IL 60637
Workplace:	Department of Economics, University of Chicago, (more information at EDIRC)

Access statistics for papers by Benjamin A Brooks.

Last updated 2021-10-05. Update your information in the RePEc Author Service.

Short-id: pbr781

Jump to Journal Articles

Working Papers

2018

First-Price Auctions with General Information Structures: A Short Introduction
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University
Revenue Guarantee Equivalence
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University
Also in CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers (2018)
See also Journal Article Revenue Guarantee Equivalence, American Economic Review, American Economic Association (2019) View citations (8) (2019)

2017

First Price Auctions with General Information Structures: Implications for Bidding and Revenue
CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers View citations (74)
Also in Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University (2016) View citations (5)
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University (2015) View citations (2)
CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers (2015) View citations (7)
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University (2016) View citations (5)
Levine's Bibliography, UCLA Department of Economics (2015) View citations (3)
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University (2015) View citations (2)
See also Journal Article First‐Price Auctions With General Information Structures: Implications for Bidding and Revenue, Econometrica, Econometric Society (2017) View citations (68) (2017)
Optimal Auction Design in a Common Value Model
CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers View citations (11)
Also in Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University (2016) View citations (9)
Working Papers, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Econometric Research Program. (2016)
Selling to Intermediaries: Optimal Auction Design in a Common Value Model
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University View citations (3)

2016

A "Pencil Sharpening" Algorithm for Two Player Stochastic Games with Perfect Monitoring
Working Papers, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Econometric Research Program. View citations (3)
Also in Research Papers, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business (2016) View citations (4)
Can the culture of honor lead to inefficient conventions ? experimental evidence from India
Policy Research Working Paper Series, The World Bank
Informationally Robust Optimal Auction Design
Working Papers, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Econometric Research Program. View citations (21)
Also in Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University (2016) View citations (24)

2014

Extremal Information Structures in the First Price Auction
Levine's Working Paper Archive, David K. Levine View citations (21)
Also in Working Papers, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Econometric Research Program. (2013) View citations (2)
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University (2013) View citations (23)
The Limits of Price Discrimination
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University
Also in Working Papers, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Econometric Research Program. (2013) View citations (12)
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University (2013) View citations (30)
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University (2014)
Levine's Working Paper Archive, David K. Levine (2013) View citations (11)
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University (2013) View citations (35)
See also Journal Article The Limits of Price Discrimination, American Economic Review, American Economic Association (2015) View citations (155) (2015)

Journal Articles

2020

Algorithms for Stochastic Games With Perfect Monitoring
Econometrica, 2020, 88, (4), 1661-1695 View citations (2)
Countering the winner's curse: optimal auction design in a common value model
Theoretical Economics, 2020, 15, (4) View citations (12)
See also Working Paper Countering the Winner's Curse: Optimal Auction Design in a Common Value Model, Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers (2019) View citations (1) (2019)

2019

Revenue Guarantee Equivalence
American Economic Review, 2019, 109, (5), 1911-29 View citations (8)
See also Working Paper Revenue Guarantee Equivalence, Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers (2018) (2018)

2017

First‐Price Auctions With General Information Structures: Implications for Bidding and Revenue
Econometrica, 2017, 85, 107-143 View citations (68)
See also Working Paper First Price Auctions with General Information Structures: Implications for Bidding and Revenue, CEPR Discussion Papers (2017) View citations (74) (2017)

2015

The Limits of Price Discrimination
American Economic Review, 2015, 105, (3), 921-57 View citations (155)
See also Working Paper The Limits of Price Discrimination, Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers (2014) (2014)