Countering the Winner's Curse: Optimal Auction Design in a Common Value Model

Dirk Bergemann, Benjamin Brooks and Stephen Morris

No 13332, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: We characterize revenue maximizing mechanisms in a common value environment where the value of the object is equal to the highest of bidders’ independent signals. If the revenue maximizing solution is to sell the object with probability one, then an optimal mechanism is simply a posted price, namely, the highest price such that every type of every bidder is willing to buy the object. If the object is optimally sold with probability less than one, then optimal mechanisms skew the allocation towards bidders with lower signals. The resulting allocation induces a “winner’s blessing,†whereby the expected value conditional on winning is higher than the unconditional expectation. By contrast, standard auctions that allocate to the bidder with the highest signal (e.g., the first-price, second-price or English auctions) deliver lower revenue because of the winner’s curse generated by the allocation. Our qualitative results extend to more general common value environments with a strong winner’s curse.

Keywords: Optimal auction; Common values; Maximum game; Posted price; Revenue equivalence; Adverse selection; Neutral selection; Advantageous selection (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D44 D82 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des, nep-gth and nep-mic
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Related works:
Journal Article: Countering the winner's curse: optimal auction design in a common value model (2020)
Working Paper: Countering the Winner's Curse: Optimal Auction Design in a Common Value Model (2019)
Working Paper: Countering the Winner's Curse: Optimal Auction Design in a Common Value Model (2018)
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