First Price Auctions with General Information Structures: Implications for Bidding and Revenue

Dirk Bergemann, Benjamin Brooks and Stephen Morris

Levine's Bibliography from UCLA Department of Economics

Date: 2015-09-21
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta and nep-mic
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Downloads: (external link)
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2642372 (application/pdf)
Our link check indicates that this URL is bad, the error code is: 403 Forbidden (http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2642372 [301 Moved Permanently]--> https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2642372)

Related works:
Journal Article: First‐Price Auctions With General Information Structures: Implications for Bidding and Revenue (2017)
Working Paper: First Price Auctions with General Information Structures: Implications for Bidding and Revenue (2017)
Working Paper: First Price Auctions with General Information Structures: Implications for Bidding and Revenue (2016)
Working Paper: First Price Auctions with General Information Structures: Implications for Bidding and Revenue (2016)
Working Paper: First Price Auctions with General Information Structures: Implications for Bidding and Revenue (2015)
Working Paper: First Price Auctions with General Information Structures: Implications for Bidding and Revenue (2015)
Working Paper: First Price Auctions with General Information Structures: Implications for Bidding and Revenue (2015)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cla:levrem:786969000000001031

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Levine's Bibliography from UCLA Department of Economics
Bibliographic data for series maintained by David K. Levine ().