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Details about Jérôme Mathis

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Workplace:Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), (more information at EDIRC)

Access statistics for papers by Jérôme Mathis.

Last updated 2012-03-24. Update your information in the RePEc Author Service.

Short-id: pma575


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Working Papers

2006

  1. Deliberation with Partially Verifiable Information
    THEMA Working Papers, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise Downloads View citations (1)
  2. Full Revelation of Information in Sender-Receiver Games of Persuasion
    THEMA Working Papers, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise Downloads View citations (11)
    See also Journal Article Full revelation of information in Sender-Receiver games of persuasion, Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier (2008) Downloads View citations (38) (2008)

2005

  1. Consulting an expert with potentially conflicting preferences
    THEMA Working Papers, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise Downloads View citations (1)
    See also Journal Article Consulting an Expert with Potentially Conflicting Preferences, Theory and Decision, Springer (2008) Downloads View citations (4) (2008)

2004

  1. Argumentation in Sender-Receiver Games
    THEMA Working Papers, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise Downloads View citations (1)

Journal Articles

2011

  1. How to consult an expert? Opinion versus evidence
    Theory and Decision, 2011, 70, (4), 447-474 Downloads

2009

  1. Rating the raters: Are reputation concerns powerful enough to discipline rating agencies?
    Journal of Monetary Economics, 2009, 56, (5), 657-674 Downloads View citations (261)

2008

  1. Consulting an Expert with Potentially Conflicting Preferences
    Theory and Decision, 2008, 65, (3), 185-204 Downloads View citations (4)
    See also Working Paper Consulting an expert with potentially conflicting preferences, THEMA Working Papers (2005) Downloads View citations (1) (2005)
  2. Full revelation of information in Sender-Receiver games of persuasion
    Journal of Economic Theory, 2008, 143, (1), 571-584 Downloads View citations (38)
    See also Working Paper Full Revelation of Information in Sender-Receiver Games of Persuasion, THEMA Working Papers (2006) Downloads View citations (11) (2006)
 
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