Full Revelation of Information in Sender-Receiver Games of Persuasion

Jérôme Mathis ()

No 2006-02, THEMA Working Papers from THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise

Abstract: A Sender-Receiver game is a two-player communication game in which a privately informed party (Sender) sends a payoff-irrelevant message on the basis of his information to a decision maker (Receiver) who then takes a payoff-relevant action. Seidmann-Winter (1997) provides necessary and sufficient conditions on players.preferences for full revelation when the Sender can certify all his payoff-relevant information and that he is not withholding information (formally, each type is certifiable). We generalize Seidmann- Winter's results to a partial certi.ability setting. We characterize the conditions on the information that the informed party can certify and more general conditions on players' preferences, which are sufficient for the existence and uniqueness of a separating equilibrium outcome.

Date: 2006
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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Journal Article: Full revelation of information in Sender-Receiver games of persuasion (2008)
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