Full revelation of information in Sender-Receiver games of persuasion

Jérôme Mathis ()

Journal of Economic Theory, 2008, vol. 143, issue 1, 571-584

Abstract: We provide necessary and sufficient conditions on both players' preferences and information that can be certified for a Sender-Receiver game to possess a separating equilibrium, as well as sufficient conditions for every equilibrium of such a game to be separating. Accordingly, we generalize Seidmann and Winter's [D.J. Seidmann, E. Winter, Strategic information transmission with verifiable messages, Econometrica 65 (1997) 163-170] results to games with partial provability.

Keywords: Disclosure; of; certifiable; information; Partial; provability; Persuasion; Separating; equilibrium; Verifiable; types (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (41)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0022-0531(08)00038-0
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
Working Paper: Full Revelation of Information in Sender-Receiver Games of Persuasion (2006)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:143:y:2008:i:1:p:571-584

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Economic Theory is currently edited by A. Lizzeri and K. Shell

More articles in Journal of Economic Theory from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().