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Details about Ichiro Obara

E-mail:
Homepage:https://sites.google.com/site/ichiroobara/
Phone:(310)794-7098
Postal address:Department of Economics UCLA, 405 Hilgard Ave., Los Angeles, CA 90095-1477
Workplace:Department of Economics, University of California-Los Angeles (UCLA), (more information at EDIRC)

Access statistics for papers by Ichiro Obara.

Last updated 2021-03-23. Update your information in the RePEc Author Service.

Short-id: pob3


Jump to Journal Articles

Working Papers

2015

  1. Repeated Games with General Discounting
    Working papers, Yonsei University, Yonsei Economics Research Institute Downloads View citations (1)
    See also Journal Article in Journal of Economic Theory (2017)

2011

  1. Informational Smallness and Privae Momnitoring in Repeated Games, Second Version
    PIER Working Paper Archive, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania Downloads

2008

  1. Firm Reputation and Horizontal Integration
    Levine's Working Paper Archive, David K. Levine Downloads View citations (7)
    Also in Levine's Bibliography, UCLA Department of Economics (2006) Downloads View citations (1)

    See also Journal Article in RAND Journal of Economics (2009)
  2. Secret Contracts for Efficient Partnerships
    Levine's Working Paper Archive, David K. Levine Downloads View citations (2)
    Also in Levine's Bibliography, UCLA Department of Economics (2007) Downloads
    Working Papers, University of Minnesota, Department of Economics (2008) Downloads View citations (1)

2007

  1. Finite State Equilibria in Dynamic Games
    2007 Meeting Papers, Society for Economic Dynamics Downloads View citations (5)
  2. Folk Theorem with Communication
    Levine's Bibliography, UCLA Department of Economics Downloads View citations (1)
    Also in UCLA Economics Online Papers, UCLA Department of Economics (2005) Downloads View citations (10)

    See also Journal Article in Journal of Economic Theory (2009)
  3. The Full Surplus Extraction Theorem with Hidden Actions
    Levine's Bibliography, UCLA Department of Economics Downloads View citations (1)
    Also in UCLA Economics Online Papers, UCLA Department of Economics Downloads View citations (4)
    Levine's Bibliography, UCLA Department of Economics (2006) Downloads View citations (9)

    See also Journal Article in The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (2008)

2006

  1. Approximate Implementability with Ex Post Budget Balance
    Levine's Bibliography, UCLA Department of Economics Downloads
  2. Less is more: An Observability Paradox in Repeated Games
    Levine's Bibliography, UCLA Department of Economics Downloads View citations (5)
    Also in CIRJE F-Series, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo (2003) Downloads View citations (1)

    See also Journal Article in International Journal of Game Theory (2006)

2005

  1. Informational Smallness and Private Monitoring in Repeated Games
    Levine's Bibliography, UCLA Department of Economics Downloads View citations (10)
    Also in PIER Working Paper Archive, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania (2005) Downloads View citations (12)
  2. Informational Smallness and Private Monitoring in Repeated Games (with R. McLean and A. Postlewaite)
    UCLA Economics Online Papers, UCLA Department of Economics Downloads View citations (1)

2004

  1. Efficiency in Repeated Games Revisited: The Role of Private Strategies
    Levine's Bibliography, UCLA Department of Economics Downloads
    Also in CIRJE F-Series, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo (2003) Downloads View citations (14)
    UCLA Economics Working Papers, UCLA Department of Economics (2003) Downloads View citations (13)

    See also Journal Article in Econometrica (2006)
  2. Efficiency in Repeated Games Revisited: The Role of Private Strategies (with M. Kandori)
    UCLA Economics Online Papers, UCLA Department of Economics Downloads View citations (1)
  3. Endogeous Monitoring
    2004 Meeting Papers, Society for Economic Dynamics View citations (6)
    Also in UCLA Economics Online Papers, UCLA Department of Economics Downloads View citations (6)
  4. Firm Reputation and Horizontal Integration (with H. Cai)
    UCLA Economics Online Papers, UCLA Department of Economics Downloads View citations (2)

2003

  1. Less is More: An Observability Paradox in Repeated Games (with M. Kandori)
    UCLA Economics Online Papers, UCLA Department of Economics Downloads

2000

  1. Belief-Based Equilibria in the Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma with Private Monitoring
    Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers, Econometric Society Downloads View citations (9)
    Also in Penn CARESS Working Papers, Penn Economics Department Downloads View citations (6)

    See also Journal Article in Journal of Economic Theory (2002)
  2. Private Strategy and Efficiency: Repeated Partnership Games Revisited
    Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers, Econometric Society Downloads View citations (13)

Undated

  1. Approximate Implementability with Ex Post Budget Balance (Joint with D. Rahman)
    UCLA Economics Online Papers, UCLA Department of Economics Downloads
  2. Secret Contracts for Efficient Partnerships (joint with D. Rahman)
    UCLA Economics Online Papers, UCLA Department of Economics Downloads
  3. The Maximum Efficient Equilibrium Payoff in the Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma
    Penn CARESS Working Papers, Penn Economics Department Downloads
    See also Journal Article in Games and Economic Behavior (2002)
  4. The Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma with Private Monitoring: a N-player case
    Penn CARESS Working Papers, Penn Economics Department Downloads
    Also in CARESS Working Papres, University of Pennsylvania Center for Analytic Research and Economics in the Social Sciences Downloads View citations (2)

Journal Articles

2017

  1. Collusion and heterogeneity of firms
    RAND Journal of Economics, 2017, 48, (1), 230-249 Downloads View citations (4)
  2. Mechanism design with information acquisition
    Economic Theory, 2017, 63, (3), 783-812 Downloads View citations (1)
  3. Repeated games with general discounting
    Journal of Economic Theory, 2017, 172, (C), 348-375 Downloads View citations (5)
    See also Working Paper (2015)

2014

  1. Robustness of public equilibria in repeated games with private monitoring
    Journal of Economic Theory, 2014, 153, (C), 191-212 Downloads

2010

  1. Mediated Partnerships
    Econometrica, 2010, 78, (1), 285-308 Downloads View citations (15)

2009

  1. Firm reputation and horizontal integration
    RAND Journal of Economics, 2009, 40, (2), 340-363 Downloads View citations (14)
    See also Working Paper (2008)
  2. Folk theorem with communication
    Journal of Economic Theory, 2009, 144, (1), 120-134 Downloads View citations (46)
    See also Working Paper (2007)

2008

  1. The Full Surplus Extraction Theorem with Hidden Actions
    The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, 2008, 8, (1), 1-28 Downloads View citations (23)
    See also Working Paper (2007)

2006

  1. Efficiency in Repeated Games Revisited: The Role of Private Strategies
    Econometrica, 2006, 74, (2), 499-519 Downloads View citations (52)
    See also Working Paper (2004)
  2. Less is more: an observability paradox in repeated games
    International Journal of Game Theory, 2006, 34, (4), 475-493 Downloads View citations (5)
    See also Working Paper (2006)

2002

  1. Belief-Based Equilibria in the Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma with Private Monitoring
    Journal of Economic Theory, 2002, 102, (1), 40-69 Downloads View citations (67)
    See also Working Paper (2000)
  2. The Maximum Efficient Equilibrium Payoff in the Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma
    Games and Economic Behavior, 2002, 40, (1), 99-122 Downloads View citations (16)
    See also Working Paper
 
Page updated 2022-06-23