Uniformly Strict Equilibrium for Repeated Games with Private Monitoring and Communication

Richard McLean, Ichiro Obara and Andrew Postlewaite

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: Cooperation through repetition is an important theme in game theory. In this regard, various celebrated ``folk theorems'' have been proposed for repeated games in increasingly more complex environments. There has, however, been insufficient attention paid to the robustness of a large set of equilibria that is needed for such folk theorems. Starting with perfect public equilibrium as our starting point, we study uniformly strict equilibria in repeated games with private monitoring and direct communication (cheap talk). We characterize the limit equilibrium payoff set and identify the conditions for the folk theorem to hold with uniformly strict equilibrium.

Date: 2023-11, Revised 2024-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-mic
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Working Paper: Uniformly Strict Equilibrium for Repeated Games with Private Monitoring and Communication (2023)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:arx:papers:2311.12242

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