Mechanism design with information acquisition

Sushil Bikhchandani and Ichiro Obara

Economic Theory, 2017, vol. 63, issue 3, No 7, 783-812

Abstract: Abstract Consider a mechanism design setting in which agents acquire costly information about an unknown, payoff-relevant state of nature before participating in the mechanism. Information gathering is covert. We investigate conditions under which (i) efficient implementation and (ii) full surplus extraction are Bayesian incentive compatible and interim individually rational.

Keywords: Information acquisition; Full surplus extraction; Efficient implementation; Mechanism design; Bayesian implementation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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DOI: 10.1007/s00199-016-0964-5

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