Details about Rainer Michael Rilke
Access statistics for papers by Rainer Michael Rilke.
Last updated 2023-03-16. Update your information in the RePEc Author Service.
Short-id: pri252
Jump to Journal Articles
Working Papers
2021
- The corruptive force of AI-generated advice
Papers, arXiv.org View citations (5)
2020
- Two Field Experiments on Self-Selection, Collaboration Intensity, and Team Performance
IZA Discussion Papers, IZA Network @ LISER View citations (1)
Also in Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition (2020)  Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Behavior, WZB Berlin Social Science Center (2020) View citations (1)
- When Too Good Is Too Much: Social Incentives and Job Selection
IZA Discussion Papers, IZA Network @ LISER View citations (1)
2018
- Designing Feedback in Voluntary Contribution Games - The Role of Transparency
WHU Working Paper Series - Economics Group, WHU - Otto Beisheim School of Management 
See also Journal Article Designing feedback in voluntary contribution games: the role of transparency, Experimental Economics, Springer (2019) View citations (7) (2019)
2017
- Team Goal Incentives and Individual Lying Behavior
WHU Working Paper Series - Economics Group, WHU - Otto Beisheim School of Management View citations (2)
2016
- Reducing ambiguity in lotteries: evidence from a field experiment
Framed Field Experiments, The Field Experiments Website View citations (2)
See also Journal Article Reducing ambiguity in lotteries: evidence from a field experiment, Applied Economics Letters, Taylor & Francis Journals (2016) View citations (2) (2016)
2015
- How to hire helpers? Evidence from a field experiment
Framed Field Experiments, The Field Experiments Website 
See also Journal Article How to hire helpers? Evidence from a field experiment, Experimental Economics, Springer (2016) View citations (4) (2016)
2013
- Self-Serving Use of Equity Rules in Bargaining with Asymmetric Outside Options
VfS Annual Conference 2013 (Duesseldorf): Competition Policy and Regulation in a Global Economic Order, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association View citations (8)
Also in IZA Discussion Papers, IZA Network @ LISER (2013) View citations (8)
2011
- Lying and Team Incentives
IZA Discussion Papers, IZA Network @ LISER View citations (40)
See also Journal Article Lying and team incentives, Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier (2013) View citations (136) (2013)
Journal Articles
2021
- When leading by example leads to less corrupt collaboration
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2021, 188, (C), 288-306 View citations (6)
2019
- Designing feedback in voluntary contribution games: the role of transparency
Experimental Economics, 2019, 22, (2), 552-576 View citations (7)
See also Working Paper Designing Feedback in Voluntary Contribution Games - The Role of Transparency, WHU Working Paper Series - Economics Group (2018) (2018)
2018
- Asymmetric outside options in ultimatum bargaining: a systematic analysis
International Journal of Game Theory, 2018, 47, (1), 301-329 View citations (16)
2017
- On the duty to give (and not to take): An experiment on moralistic punishment
Journal of Business Economics, 2017, 87, (9), 1129-1150
2016
- How to hire helpers? Evidence from a field experiment
Experimental Economics, 2016, 19, (3), 577-594 View citations (4)
See also Working Paper How to hire helpers? Evidence from a field experiment, Framed Field Experiments (2015) (2015)
- Reducing ambiguity in lotteries: evidence from a field experiment
Applied Economics Letters, 2016, 23, (3), 206-211 View citations (2)
See also Working Paper Reducing ambiguity in lotteries: evidence from a field experiment, Framed Field Experiments (2016) View citations (2) (2016)
2014
- Honesty in tournaments
Economics Letters, 2014, 123, (1), 90-93 View citations (74)
2013
- Lying and team incentives
Journal of Economic Psychology, 2013, 34, (C), 1-7 View citations (136)
See also Working Paper Lying and Team Incentives, IZA Discussion Papers (2011) View citations (40) (2011)
|
The links between different versions of a paper are constructed automatically by matching on the titles.
Please contact if a link is incorrect.
Use this form
to add links between versions where the titles do not match.
|