Two Field Experiments on Self-Selection, Collaboration Intensity, and Team Performance
Mira Fischer,
Rainer Rilke and
Burcin Yurtoglu
No 241, Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series from CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition
Abstract:
We analyze how the team formation process influences the ability composition and performance of teams, showing how self-selection and random assignment affect team performance for different tasks in two natural field experiments. We identify the collaboration intensity of the task as the key driver of the effect of self-selection on team performance. We find that when the task requires low collaborative efforts, the team performance of self-selected teams is significantly inferior to that of randomly assigned teams. When the task involves more collaborative efforts, self-selected teams tend to outperform randomly assigned teams. We observe assortative matching in self-selected teams, with subjects more likely to match with those of similar ability and the same gender.
Keywords: team performance; self-selection; field experiment; education (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C93 I21 M54 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020-05-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp and nep-hrm
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Related works:
Working Paper: Two Field Experiments on Self-Selection, Collaboration Intensity, and Team Performance (2020) 
Working Paper: Two field experiments on self-selection, collaboration intensity, and team performance (2020) 
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:rco:dpaper:241
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