Lying and Team Incentives

Julian Conrads, Bernd Irlenbusch (), Rainer Rilke and Gari Walkowitz ()
Additional contact information
Bernd Irlenbusch: University of Cologne

No 5968, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Abstract: We investigate the influence of two widespread compensation schemes, individual piece-rates and team incentives, on participants' inclination to lie, by adapting the experimental setup of Fischbacher and Heusi (2008). Lying turns out to be more pronounced under team incentives than under individual piece-rates, which highlights a so far fairly neglected feature of these compensation schemes.

Keywords: lying; compensation schemes; team; experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 C92 M52 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 10 pages
Date: 2011-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec, nep-cbe, nep-exp, nep-hrm and nep-lab
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (40)

Published - published in: Journal of Economic Psychology, 2013, 34, 1-7

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Journal Article: Lying and team incentives (2013)
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