Details about Bianca Rundshagen

Access statistics for papers by Bianca Rundshagen.

Last updated 2010-06-16. Update your information in the RePEc Author Service.

Short-id: pru122

Working Papers

2009

1. Buchanan-Kooperation und Internationale Oeffentliche Gueter
   Working Paper, Helmut Schmidt University, Hamburg
2. Simulating a Sequential Coalition Formation Process for the Climate Change Problem: First Come, but Second Served?
   Working Papers, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei View citations (1)

2005

3. Participation in International Environmental Agreements: The Role of Timing and Regulation
   Working Papers, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei View citations (8)
4. Uniqueness of Coalitional Equilibria
   Working Papers, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei View citations (3)

2003

5. A Non-cooperative Foundation of Core-Stability in Positive Externality NTU-Coalition Games
   Working Papers, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei View citations (4)
6. How the Rules of Coalition Formation Affect Stability of International Environmental Agreements
   Working Papers, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei View citations (14)

Journal Articles

2009

1. Membership rules and stability of coalition structures in positive externality games
   Social Choice and Welfare, 2009, 32, (3), 389-406 View citations (26)

2008

2. Environmental Liability Law and Induced Technical Change: The Role of Spillovers
   Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), 2008, 164, (2), 254-279 View citations (16)

2007

3. Environmental Liability Law and Induced Technical Change – The Role of Discounting
   Environmental & Resource Economics, 2007, 36, (3), 341-366 View citations (18)

2006

4. A Micro Foundation of Core Stability in Positive-Externality Coalition Games
   Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), 2006, 162, (2), 329-346 View citations (7)

1998

5. Renegotiation–Proof Equilibria in a Global Emission Game When Players Are Impatient
   Environmental & Resource Economics, 1998, 12, (3), 275-306 View citations (25)
6. Toward a Positive Theory of Coalition Formation and Endogenous Instrumental Choice in Global Pollution Control
   Public Choice, 1998, 96, (1-2), 145-86 View citations (12)