Simulating a Sequential Coalition Formation Process for the Climate Change Problem: First Come, but Second Served?

Michael Finus (), Bianca Rundshagen () and Johan Eyckmans ()

No 2009.109, Working Papers from Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei

Abstract: We analyze stability of self-enforcing climate agreements based on a data set generated by the CLIMNEG world simulation model (CWSM), version 1.2. We consider two new aspects which appear important in actual treaty-making. First, we consider a sequential coalition formation process where players can make proposals which are either accepted or countered by other proposals. Second, we analyze whether a moderator, like an international organization, even without enforcement power, can improve upon globally suboptimal outcomes through coordinating actions by making recommendations that must be Pareto-improving to all parties. We discuss the conceptual difficulties of implementing our algorithm.

Keywords: International Climate Agreements; Sequential Coalition Formation; Coordination through Moderator; Integrated Assessment Model; Algorithm for Computations (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C79 H87 Q54 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-cmp, nep-ene, nep-env and nep-gth
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Simulating a sequential coalition formation process for the climate change problem: first come, but second served? (2014)
Working Paper: Simulating a Sequential Coalition Formation Process for the Climate Change Problem: First Come, but Second Served? (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fem:femwpa:2009.109

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