Simulating a sequential coalition formation process for the climate change problem: first come, but second served?

Michael Finus (), Bianca Rundshagen () and Johan Eyckmans

Annals of Operations Research, 2014, vol. 220, issue 1, 5-23

Abstract: We analyze stability of self-enforcing climate agreements, considering a sequential coalition formation process of heterogeneous and farsighted players. Players can make proposals which are either accepted or countered by alternative proposals. We discuss the conceptual difficulties of implementing and solving such a game and the strategic options arising in a sequential process. This is illustrated with simple examples and with numerical simulations using the CLIMNEG world simulation model (CWSM). Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2014

Keywords: International climate agreements; Sequential coalition formation; Integrated assessment model (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Related works:
Working Paper: Simulating a Sequential Coalition Formation Process for the Climate Change Problem: First Come, but Second Served? (2009)
Working Paper: Simulating a Sequential Coalition Formation Process for the Climate Change Problem: First Come, but Second Served? (2009)
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DOI: 10.1007/s10479-010-0815-x

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