Simulating a Sequential Coalition Formation Process for the Climate Change Problem: First Come, but Second Served?

Michael Finus (), Bianca Rundshagen and Johan Eyckmans

No 55830, Sustainable Development Papers from Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)

Abstract: We analyze stability of self-enforcing climate agreements based on a data set generated by the CLIMNEG world simulation model (CWSM), version 1.2. We consider two new aspects which appear important in actual treaty-making. First, we consider a sequential coalition formation process where players can make proposals which are either accepted or countered by other proposals. Second, we analyze whether a moderator, like an international organization, even without enforcement power, can improve upon globally suboptimal outcomes through coordinating actions by making recommendations that must be Pareto-improving to all parties. We discuss the conceptual difficulties of implementing our algorithm.

Keywords: Environmental; Economics; and; Policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 49
Date: 2009-12
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https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/55830/files/109-09.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Simulating a sequential coalition formation process for the climate change problem: first come, but second served? (2014)
Working Paper: Simulating a Sequential Coalition Formation Process for the Climate Change Problem: First Come, but Second Served? (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:feemdp:55830

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.55830

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