Uniqueness of Coalitional Equilibria

Michael Finus (michael.finus@uni-graz.at), Pierre Mouche (pvmouche@yahoo.fr) and Bianca Rundshagen (bianca.rundshagen@fernuni-hagen.de)

No 2005.23, Working Papers from Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei

Abstract: We provide an existence and a uniqueness result for coalitional equilibria of a game in strategic form. Both results are illustrated for a public good game and a homogeneous Cournot-oligopoly game.

Keywords: Existence and uniqueness of coalitional equilibrium; Game in strategic form (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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