EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Details about Barry R. Weingast

E-mail:
Homepage:https://www.stanford.edu/group/mcnollgast/cgi-bin/wordpress/
Workplace:Stanford University

Access statistics for papers by Barry R. Weingast.

Last updated 2018-09-05. Update your information in the RePEc Author Service.

Short-id: pwe334


Jump to Journal Articles Books Edited books Chapters

Working Papers

2007

  1. Limited access orders in the developing world:a new approach to the problems of development
    Policy Research Working Paper Series, The World Bank Downloads View citations (27)

2006

  1. A Conceptual Framework for Interpreting Recorded Human History
    NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc Downloads View citations (56)

2005

  1. Equilibrium Impotence: Why the States and Not the American National Government Financed Economic Development in the Antebellum Era
    NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc Downloads View citations (3)
  2. The Financing of 19th Century Internal Improvements
    Department of Economics, Working Paper Series, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley Downloads
  3. The Political Economy of Law: Decision-Making by Judicial, Legislative, Executive and Administrative Agencies
    Discussion Papers, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research Downloads

1999

  1. Regional Decentralization and Fiscal Incentives: Federalism, Chinese Style
    Working Papers, Stanford University, Department of Economics Downloads View citations (32)
    See also Journal Article in Journal of Public Economics (2005)

1998

  1. From Federalism, Chinese Style, to Privatization, Chinese Style
    CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers Downloads
    Also in Working Papers, Stanford University, Department of Economics (1997) Downloads View citations (4)
    William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan (1997) Downloads View citations (4)

    See also Journal Article in The Economics of Transition (1999)

1997

  1. Federalism as a Commitment to Preserving Market Incentives
    Working Papers, Stanford University, Department of Economics Downloads View citations (342)
    See also Journal Article in Journal of Economic Perspectives (1997)

1990

  1. POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE THRIFT DEBACLE
    GSIA Working Papers, Carnegie Mellon University, Tepper School of Business View citations (3)
    See also Chapter (1991)

1987

  1. Regulation and the Theory of Legislative Choice: The Interstate Commerce Act of 1887
    Working Papers, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences Downloads
    See also Journal Article in Journal of Law and Economics (1989)
  2. The Economic Incidence of the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887.: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis of the Shorthaul Pricing Constraint
    Working Papers, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences Downloads
    See also Journal Article in RAND Journal of Economics (1990)

1977

  1. Responses to Disaster: Planning for a Great Earthquake in California
    Working Papers, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences Downloads

1976

  1. A Rational Choice Perspective on Congressional Norms
    Working Papers, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences Downloads

Undated

  1. Safety Regulation
    Working Papers, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences Downloads View citations (8)

Journal Articles

2016

  1. Authoritarian Survival and Poverty Traps: Land Reform in Mexico
    World Development, 2016, 77, (C), 154-170 Downloads View citations (7)
  2. Exposing the neoclassical fallacy: McCloskey on ideas and the great enrichment
    Scandinavian Economic History Review, 2016, 64, (3), 189-201 Downloads View citations (4)

2015

  1. Capitalism, Democracy, and Countermajoritarian Institutions
    Supreme Court Economic Review, 2015, 23, (1), 255 - 277 Downloads
  2. The "Reformation of Administrative Law" Revisited
    Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 2015, 31, (4), 782-807 Downloads

2014

  1. Second Generation Fiscal Federalism: Political Aspects of Decentralization and Economic Development
    World Development, 2014, 53, (C), 14-25 Downloads View citations (44)

2013

  1. Self-Enforcing Constitutions: With an Application to Democratic Stability In America's First Century
    Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 2013, 29, (2), 278-302 Downloads View citations (5)

2012

  1. In the Shadow of Violence: Lessons for Limited Access Societies
    VOPROSY ECONOMIKI, 2012, 3 View citations (2)
  2. Why so much stability? Majority voting, legislative institutions, and Gordon Tullock
    Public Choice, 2012, 152, (1), 83-95 Downloads View citations (6)

2009

  1. Second generation fiscal federalism: The implications of fiscal incentives
    Journal of Urban Economics, 2009, 65, (3), 279-293 Downloads View citations (167)

2007

  1. Constructing Self-Enforcing Federalism in the Early United States and Modern Russia
    Publius: The Journal of Federalism, 2007, 37, (2), 160-189 Downloads View citations (3)

2006

  1. Rationality, Inaccurate Mental Models, and Self-confirming Equilibrium
    Journal of Theoretical Politics, 2006, 18, (4), 384-415 Downloads

2005

  1. Regional decentralization and fiscal incentives: Federalism, Chinese style
    Journal of Public Economics, 2005, 89, (9-10), 1719-1742 Downloads View citations (259)
    See also Working Paper (1999)
  2. The Constitutional Dilemma of Economic Liberty
    Journal of Economic Perspectives, 2005, 19, (3), 89-108 Downloads View citations (21)

2004

  1. Introduction
    Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), 2004, 160, (4), 702-708 Downloads

2003

  1. The Democratic Advantage: Institutional Foundations of Financial Power in International Competition
    International Organization, 2003, 57, (1), 3-42 Downloads View citations (23)

2000

  1. The American System of Shared Powers: The President, Congress, and the NLRB
    Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 2000, 16, (2), 269-305 View citations (7)
  2. The Analytic Narrative Project - Analytic Narratives. By Robert H. Bates, Avner Greif, Margaret Levi, Jean-Laurent Rosenthal, and Barry Weingast. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998. 296p. $65.00 cloth, $22.95 paper
    American Political Science Review, 2000, 94, (3), 696-702 Downloads View citations (3)

1999

  1. From federalism, Chinese style to privatization, Chinese style
    The Economics of Transition, 1999, 7, (1), 103-131 Downloads View citations (90)
    See also Working Paper (1998)

1998

  1. The Politics of Interpretation: Rationality, Culture, and Transition
    Politics & Society, 1998, 26, (4), 603-642 Downloads View citations (4)
    Also in Politics & Society, 1998, 26, (2), 221-256 (1998) Downloads View citations (2)

1997

  1. Federalism as a Commitment to Reserving Market Incentives
    Journal of Economic Perspectives, 1997, 11, (4), 83-92 Downloads View citations (59)
    See also Working Paper (1997)
  2. The Political Foundations of Democracy and the Rule of the Law
    American Political Science Review, 1997, 91, (2), 245-263 Downloads View citations (171)

1996

  1. China's transition to markets: market-preserving federalism, chinese style
    Journal of Economic Policy Reform, 1996, 1, (2), 149-185 Downloads View citations (60)
  2. The Myth of Demócratic Failure: Why Political Institutions Are Efficient. By Donald Wittman. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995. 240p. $29.95
    American Political Science Review, 1996, 90, (3), 663-664 Downloads

1995

  1. A Rational Choice Perspective on the Role of Ideas: Shared Belief Systems and State Sovereignty in International Cooperation
    Politics & Society, 1995, 23, (4), 449-464 Downloads
  2. The Economic Role of Political Institutions: Market-Preserving Federalism and Economic Development
    Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 1995, 11, (1), 1-31 View citations (321)

1994

  1. Coordination, Commitment, and Enforcement: The Case of the Merchant Guild
    Journal of Political Economy, 1994, 102, (4), 745-76 Downloads View citations (230)

1992

  1. A positive theory of statutory interpretation
    International Review of Law and Economics, 1992, 12, (2), 263-279 Downloads View citations (31)
  2. Editors' introduction
    International Review of Law and Economics, 1992, 12, (2), 123-124 Downloads

1990

  1. Positive and Normative Models of Procedural Rights: An Integrative Approach to Administrative Procedures
    Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 1990, 6, 307-32 View citations (8)
  2. Slack, Public Interest, and Structure-Induced Policy
    Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 1990, 6, 203-12 View citations (2)
  3. THE ROLE OF INSTITUTIONS IN THE REVIVAL OF TRADE: THE LAW MERCHANT, PRIVATE JUDGES, AND THE CHAMPAGNE FAIRS
    Economics and Politics, 1990, 2, (1), 1-23 Downloads View citations (235)
  4. The Economic Incidence of the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis of the Short-Haul Pricing Constraint
    RAND Journal of Economics, 1990, 21, (2), 189-210 Downloads View citations (2)
    See also Working Paper (1987)
  5. The Role of Credible Commitments in State Finance: Review Article
    Public Choice, 1990, 66, (1), 89-97 View citations (1)

1989

  1. Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England
    The Journal of Economic History, 1989, 49, (4), 803-832 Downloads View citations (820)
  2. Floor Behavior in the U.S. Congress: Committee Power Under the Open Rule
    American Political Science Review, 1989, 83, (3), 795-815 Downloads
  3. Regulation and the Theory of Legislative Choice: The Interstate Commerce Act of 1887
    Journal of Law and Economics, 1989, 32, (1), 35-61 Downloads View citations (23)
    See also Working Paper (1987)

1988

  1. The Industrial Organization of Congress; or, Why Legislatures, Like Firms, Are Not Organized as Markets
    Journal of Political Economy, 1988, 96, (1), 132-63 Downloads View citations (127)

1987

  1. Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control
    Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 1987, 3, (2), 243-77 View citations (221)
  2. The Institutional Foundations of Committee Power
    American Political Science Review, 1987, 81, (1), 85-104 Downloads View citations (67)
  3. Why are Congressional Committees Powerful?
    American Political Science Review, 1987, 81, (3), 929-945 Downloads View citations (13)

1986

  1. Congress and Regulatory Agency Choice: Reply [Bureaucratic Discretion or Congressional Control? Regulatory Policymaking by the Federal Trade Commission]
    Journal of Political Economy, 1986, 94, (4), 890-94 Downloads

1984

  1. Political Solutions to Market Problems
    American Political Science Review, 1984, 78, (2), 417-434 Downloads View citations (26)
  2. The congressional-bureaucratic system: a principal agent perspective (with applications to the SEC)
    Public Choice, 1984, 44, (1), 147-191 Downloads View citations (37)

1983

  1. Bureaucratic Discretion or Congressional Control? Regulatory Policymaking by the Federal Trade Commission
    Journal of Political Economy, 1983, 91, (5), 765-800 Downloads View citations (140)

1982

  1. Congress as the
    American Economic Review, 1982, 72, (2), 109-13 Downloads
  2. Institutionalizing Majority Rule: A Social Choice Theory with Policy Implications
    American Economic Review, 1982, 72, (2), 367-71 Downloads View citations (10)
  3. RUNAWAY BUREAUCRACY AND CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT: WHY REFORMS FAIL
    Review of Policy Research, 1982, 1, (3), 557-564 Downloads

1981

  1. Structure-induced equilibrium and legislative choice
    Public Choice, 1981, 37, (3), 503-519 Downloads View citations (99)
  2. The Political Economy of Benefits and Costs: A Neoclassical Approach to Distributive Politics
    Journal of Political Economy, 1981, 89, (4), 642-64 Downloads View citations (521)

Books

2013

  1. Violence and Social Orders
    Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press View citations (3)
    Also in Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press (2009) View citations (77)

2008

  1. The Oxford Handbook of Political Economy
    OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press View citations (54)

Edited books

2013

  1. In the Shadow of Violence
    Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press View citations (2)

Chapters

2017

  1. Adam Smith’s Theory of Violence and the Political Economics of Development
    A chapter in Organizations, Civil Society, and the Roots of Development, 2017, pp 51-81 Downloads

2016

  1. Opening Access, Ending the Violence Trap: Labor, Business, Government, and the National Labor Relations Act
    A chapter in Organizations, Civil Society, and the Roots of Development, 2016, pp 331-366 Downloads

2010

  1. The Constitutional Choices of 1787 and Their Consequences
    A chapter in Founding Choices: American Economic Policy in the 1790s, 2010, pp 25-56 Downloads

2001

  1. Rational choice theories of bureaucratic control and performance
    Chapter 12 in The Elgar Companion to Public Choice, 2001 Downloads

1991

  1. Political Foundations of the Thrift Debacle
    A chapter in Politics and Economics in the Eighties, 1991, pp 175-214 Downloads View citations (9)
    See also Working Paper (1990)
 
Page updated 2021-03-06