Details about Barry R. Weingast

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Homepage:	https://www.stanford.edu/group/mcnollgast/cgi-bin/wordpress/
Workplace:	Stanford University

Access statistics for papers by Barry R. Weingast.

Last updated 2018-09-05. Update your information in the RePEc Author Service.

Short-id: pwe334

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Working Papers

2007

1. Limited access orders in the developing world:a new approach to the problems of development
   Policy Research Working Paper Series, The World Bank View citations (71)

2006

2. A Conceptual Framework for Interpreting Recorded Human History
   NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc View citations (75)

2005

3. Equilibrium Impotence: Why the States and Not the American National Government Financed Economic Development in the Antebellum Era
   NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc View citations (11)
4. The Political Economy of Law: Decision-Making by Judicial, Legislative, Executive and Administrative Agencies
   Discussion Papers, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research

1999

5. Regional Decentralization and Fiscal Incentives: Federalism, Chinese Style
   Working Papers, Stanford University, Department of Economics View citations (48)
   See also Journal Article Regional decentralization and fiscal incentives: Federalism, Chinese style, Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier (2005) View citations (413) (2005)

1998

6. From Federalism, Chinese Style, to Privatization, Chinese Style
   CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers View citations (1)
   Also in William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan (1997) View citations (10)
   Working Papers, Stanford University, Department of Economics (1997) View citations (6)
   See also Journal Article From federalism, Chinese style to privatization, Chinese style, The Economics of Transition, The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (1999) View citations (141) (1999)

1997

7. Federalism as a Commitment to Preserving Market Incentives
   Working Papers, Stanford University, Department of Economics View citations (427)
   See also Journal Article Federalism as a Commitment to Reserving Market Incentives, Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association (1997) View citations (110) (1997)

1990

8. POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE THRIFT DEBACLE
   GSIA Working Papers, Carnegie Mellon University, Tepper School of Business View citations (3)
   See also Chapter Political Foundations of the Thrift Debacle, NBER Chapters, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc (1991) View citations (19) (1991)

1987

9. Regulation and the Theory of Legislative Choice: The Interstate Commerce Act of 1887
   Working Papers, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences
   See also Journal Article Regulation and the Theory of Legislative Choice: The Interstate Commerce Act of 1887, Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press (1989) View citations (31) (1989)
10. The Economic Incidence of the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887.: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis of the Shorthaul Pricing Constraint
    Working Papers, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences
    See also Journal Article The Economic Incidence of the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis of the Short-Haul Pricing Constraint, RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation (1990) View citations (4) (1990)

1977

11. Responses to Disaster: Planning for a Great Earthquake in California
    Working Papers, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences

1976

12. A Rational Choice Perspective on Congressional Norms
    Working Papers, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences

Undated

13. Safety Regulation
    Working Papers, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences

Journal Articles

2016

1. Authoritarian Survival and Poverty Traps: Land Reform in Mexico
   World Development, 2016, 77, (C), 154-170 View citations (18)
2. Exposing the neoclassical fallacy: McCloskey on ideas and the great enrichment
   Scandinavian Economic History Review, 2016, 64, (3), 189-201 View citations (6)

2015

3. Capitalism, Democracy, and Countermajoritarian Institutions
   Supreme Court Economic Review, 2015, 23, (1), 255 - 277 View citations (1)
4. The "Reformation of Administrative Law" Revisited
   The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 2015, 31, (4), 782-807

2014

5. Second Generation Fiscal Federalism: Political Aspects of Decentralization and Economic Development
   World Development, 2014, 53, (C), 14-25 View citations (80)

2013

6. Self-Enforcing Constitutions: With an Application to Democratic Stability In America's First Century
   The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 2013, 29, (2), 278-302 View citations (6)

2012

7. Why so much stability? Majority voting, legislative institutions, and Gordon Tullock
   Public Choice, 2012, 152, (1), 83-95 View citations (9)

2009

8. Second generation fiscal federalism: The implications of fiscal incentives
   Journal of Urban Economics, 2009, 65, (3), 279-293 View citations (295)

2007

9. Constructing Self-Enforcing Federalism in the Early United States and Modern Russia
   Publius: The Journal of Federalism, 2007, 37, (2), 160-189 View citations (6)

2006

10. Rationality, Inaccurate Mental Models, and Self-confirming Equilibrium
    Journal of Theoretical Politics, 2006, 18, (4), 384-415 View citations (2)

2005

11. Regional decentralization and fiscal incentives: Federalism, Chinese style
    Journal of Public Economics, 2005, 89, (9-10), 1719-1742 View citations (413)
    See also Working Paper Regional Decentralization and Fiscal Incentives: Federalism, Chinese Style, Working Papers (1999) View citations (48) (1999)
12. The Constitutional Dilemma of Economic Liberty
    Journal of Economic Perspectives, 2005, 19, (3), 89-108 View citations (31)

2004

13. Introduction
    Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), 2004, 160, (4), 702-708

2003

14. The Democratic Advantage: Institutional Foundations of Financial Power in International Competition
    International Organization, 2003, 57, (1), 3-42 View citations (50)

2000

15. The American System of Shared Powers: The President, Congress, and the NLRB
    The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 2000, 16, (2), 269-305 View citations (16)
16. The Analytic Narrative Project - Analytic Narratives. By Robert H. Bates, Avner Greif, Margaret Levi, Jean-Laurent Rosenthal, and Barry Weingast. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998. 296p. $65.00 cloth, $22.95 paper
    American Political Science Review, 2000, 94, (3), 696-702 View citations (4)

1999

17. From federalism, Chinese style to privatization, Chinese style
    The Economics of Transition, 1999, 7, (1), 103-131 View citations (141)
    See also Working Paper From Federalism, Chinese Style, to Privatization, Chinese Style, CEPR Discussion Papers (1998) View citations (1) (1998)

1998

18. The Politics of Interpretation: Rationality, Culture, and Transition
    Politics & Society, 1998, 26, (4), 603-642 View citations (17)
    Also in Politics & Society, 1998, 26, (2), 221-256 (1998) View citations (16)

1997

19. Federalism as a Commitment to Reserving Market Incentives
    Journal of Economic Perspectives, 1997, 11, (4), 83-92 View citations (110)
    See also Working Paper Federalism as a Commitment to Preserving Market Incentives, Working Papers (1997) View citations (427) (1997)
20. The Political Foundations of Democracy and the Rule of the Law
    American Political Science Review, 1997, 91, (2), 245-263 View citations (260)

1996

21. China's transition to markets: market-preserving federalism, chinese style
    Journal of Economic Policy Reform, 1996, 1, (2), 149-185 View citations (99)
22. The Myth of Demócratic Failure: Why Political Institutions Are Efficient. By Donald Wittman. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995. 240p. $29.95
    American Political Science Review, 1996, 90, (3), 663-664

1995

23. A Rational Choice Perspective on the Role of Ideas: Shared Belief Systems and State Sovereignty in International Cooperation
    Politics & Society, 1995, 23, (4), 449-464 View citations (3)
24. The Economic Role of Political Institutions: Market-Preserving Federalism and Economic Development
    The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 1995, 11, (1), 1-31 View citations (555)

1994

25. Coordination, Commitment, and Enforcement: The Case of the Merchant Guild
    Journal of Political Economy, 1994, 102, (4), 745-76 View citations (279)

1992

26. A positive theory of statutory interpretation
    International Review of Law and Economics, 1992, 12, (2), 263-279 View citations (40)
27. Editors' introduction
    International Review of Law and Economics, 1992, 12, (2), 123-124

1990

28. Positive and Normative Models of Procedural Rights: An Integrative Approach to Administrative Procedures
    The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 1990, 6, 307-32 View citations (9)
29. Slack, Public Interest, and Structure-Induced Policy
    The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 1990, 6, 203-12 View citations (3)
30. THE ROLE OF INSTITUTIONS IN THE REVIVAL OF TRADE: THE LAW MERCHANT, PRIVATE JUDGES, AND THE CHAMPAGNE FAIRS
    Economics and Politics, 1990, 2, (1), 1-23 View citations (459)
31. The Economic Incidence of the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis of the Short-Haul Pricing Constraint
    RAND Journal of Economics, 1990, 21, (2), 189-210 View citations (4)
    See also Working Paper The Economic Incidence of the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887.: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis of the Shorthaul Pricing Constraint, Working Papers (1987) (1987)
32. The Role of Credible Commitments in State Finance: Review Article
    Public Choice, 1990, 66, (1), 89-97 View citations (2)

1989

33. Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England
    The Journal of Economic History, 1989, 49, (4), 803-832 View citations (1289)
34. Floor Behavior in the U.S. Congress: Committee Power Under the Open Rule
    American Political Science Review, 1989, 83, (3), 795-815 View citations (6)
35. Regulation and the Theory of Legislative Choice: The Interstate Commerce Act of 1887
    Journal of Law and Economics, 1989, 32, (1), 35-61 View citations (31)
    See also Working Paper Regulation and the Theory of Legislative Choice: The Interstate Commerce Act of 1887, Working Papers (1987) (1987)

1988

36. The Industrial Organization of Congress; or, Why Legislatures, Like Firms, Are Not Organized as Markets
    Journal of Political Economy, 1988, 96, (1), 132-63 View citations (213)

1987

37. Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control
    The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 1987, 3, (2), 243-77 View citations (326)
38. The Institutional Foundations of Committee Power
    American Political Science Review, 1987, 81, (1), 85-104 View citations (97)
39. Why are Congressional Committees Powerful?
    American Political Science Review, 1987, 81, (3), 929-945 View citations (22)

1986

40. Congress and Regulatory Agency Choice: Reply [Bureaucratic Discretion or Congressional Control? Regulatory Policymaking by the Federal Trade Commission]
    Journal of Political Economy, 1986, 94, (4), 890-94

1984

41. Political Solutions to Market Problems
    American Political Science Review, 1984, 78, (2), 417-434 View citations (30)
42. The congressional-bureaucratic system: a principal agent perspective (with applications to the SEC)
    Public Choice, 1984, 44, (1), 147-191 View citations (78)

1983

43. Bureaucratic Discretion or Congressional Control? Regulatory Policymaking by the Federal Trade Commission
    Journal of Political Economy, 1983, 91, (5), 765-800 View citations (217)

1982

44. Congress as the
    American Economic Review, 1982, 72, (2), 109-13 View citations (2)
45. Institutionalizing Majority Rule: A Social Choice Theory with Policy Implications
    American Economic Review, 1982, 72, (2), 367-71 View citations (14)
46. RUNAWAY BUREAUCRACY AND CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT: WHY REFORMS FAIL
    Review of Policy Research, 1982, 1, (3), 557-564

1981

47. Structure-induced equilibrium and legislative choice
    Public Choice, 1981, 37, (3), 503-519 View citations (149)
48. The Political Economy of Benefits and Costs: A Neoclassical Approach to Distributive Politics
    Journal of Political Economy, 1981, 89, (4), 642-64 View citations (790)

Books

2013

1. Violence and Social Orders
   Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press View citations (16)
   Also in Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press (2009) View citations (830)

2008

2. The Oxford Handbook of Political Economy
   OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press View citations (124)

Edited books

2013

1. In the Shadow of Violence
   Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press View citations (57)

Chapters

2017

1. Adam Smith’s Theory of Violence and the Political Economics of Development
   A chapter in Organizations, Civil Society, and the Roots of Development, 2017, pp 51-81 View citations (1)

2016

2. Opening Access, Ending the Violence Trap: Labor, Business, Government, and the National Labor Relations Act
   A chapter in Organizations, Civil Society, and the Roots of Development, 2016, pp 331-366

2010

3. The Constitutional Choices of 1787 and Their Consequences
   A chapter in Founding Choices: American Economic Policy in the 1790s, 2010, pp 25-56

2001

4. Rational choice theories of bureaucratic control and performance
   Chapter 12 in The Elgar Companion to Public Choice, 2001

1991

5. Political Foundations of the Thrift Debacle
   A chapter in Politics and Economics in the Eighties, 1991, pp 175-214 View citations (19)
   See also Working Paper POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE THRIFT DEBACLE, Carnegie Mellon University, Tepper School of Business (1990) View citations (3) (1990)