Self-Enforcing Constitutions: With an Application to Democratic Stability In America's First Century

Sonia Mittal and Barry Weingast ()

The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 2013, vol. 29, issue 2, 278-302

Abstract: Most students of constitutions focus on normative questions or study the effects of particular constitutional provisions. This article falls into a third and much smaller tradition that attempts to study what makes some constitutions more likely to survive. This article develops a theory of self-enforcing constitutions and then applies it to the early United States. But for the issue of slavery, constitutional democracy in the United States was self-enforcing by about 1800. Nonetheless, crises over slavery threatened the nation on numerous occasions. The civil war decisively ended slavery as a source of political division, allowing self-enforcing democracy (for white males) to reemerge following the Compromise of 1877. The Author 2011. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of Yale University. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oup.com, Oxford University Press.

Date: 2013
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