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Redesigning the US Army's Branching Process: A Case Study in Minimalist Market Design

Kyle Greenberg, Parag Pathak and Tayfun Sönmez

American Economic Review, 2024, vol. 114, issue 4, 1070-1106

Abstract: We present a proof-of-concept for minimalist market design (Sönmez 2023) as an effective methodology to enhance an institution based on stakeholders' desiderata with minimal interference. Four objectives—respecting merit, increasing retention, aligning talent, and enhancing trust—guided reforms to the US Army's centralized branching process of cadets to military specialties since 2006. USMA's mechanism for the class of 2020 exacerbated challenges in implementing these objectives. Formulating the Army's desiderata as rigorous axioms, we analyze their implications. Under our minimalist approach to institution redesign, the Army's objectives uniquely identify a branching mechanism. Our design is now adopted at USMA and ROTC.

JEL-codes: D47 H56 J45 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Working Paper: Redesigning the US Army's Branching Process: A Case Study in Minimalist Market Design (2023) Downloads
Working Paper: Redesigning the US Army’s Branching Process: A Case Study in Minimalist Market Design (2021) Downloads
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DOI: 10.1257/aer.20211743

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