Sovereign Debt: Is to Forgive to Forget?

Jeremy Bulow and Kenneth Rogoff

American Economic Review, 1989, vol. 79, issue 1, 43-50

Abstract: This paper shows that, under fairly general conditions, lending to small countries must be supported by the direct sanctions available to creditors and cannot be supported by a country's "reputation for repayment." This distinction is critically important for understanding the true underlying nature of sovereign lending contracts and for comparing policy alternatives for dealing with the developing country debt problem. Copyright 1989 by American Economic Association.

Date: 1989
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Related works:
Working Paper: Sovereign Debt: Is to Forgive to Forget (1998)
Working Paper: SOVEREIGN DEBT: IS TO FORGIVE TO FORGET? (1988)
Working Paper: SOVEREIGN DEBT: IS TO FORGIVE TO FORGET? (1988)
Working Paper: Sovereign Debt: Is To Forgive To Forget? (1988)
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