Financial Education versus Costly Counseling: How to Dissuade Borrowers from Choosing Risky Mortgages?

Sumit Agarwal, Gene Amromin, Itzhak Ben-David, Souphala Chomsisengphet and Douglas D. Evanoff

American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 2020, vol. 12, issue 1, 1-32

Abstract: This paper explores the effects of mandatory third-party review of mortgage contracts on consumer choice. The study is based on a legislative pilot carried out in Illinois in 2006, under which mortgage counseling was triggered by applicant credit scores or by their choice of "risky mortgages." Low-credit score applicants for whom counselor review was mandatory did not materially alter their contract choice. Conversely, higher credit score applicants who could avoid counseling by choosing nonrisky mortgages did so, decreasing their propensity for high-risk contracts between 10 and 40 percent. In the event, one of the key goals of the legislation—curtailment of high-risk mortgage products—was only achieved among the population that was not counseled.

JEL-codes: D14 D18 G21 R21 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.aeaweb.org/doi/10.1257/pol.20150313 (application/pdf)
https://www.aeaweb.org/doi/10.1257/pol.20150313.data (application/zip)
https://www.aeaweb.org/doi/10.1257/pol.20150313.ds (application/zip)
Access to full text is restricted to AEA members and institutional subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aea:aejpol:v:12:y:2020:i:1:p:1-32

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
https://www.aeaweb.org/journals/subscriptions

DOI: 10.1257/pol.20150313

Access Statistics for this article

American Economic Journal: Economic Policy is currently edited by Matthew Shapiro

More articles in American Economic Journal: Economic Policy from American Economic Association Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Michael P. Albert ().