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Improving Police Performance in Rajasthan, India: Experimental Evidence on Incentives, Managerial Autonomy, and Training

Abhijit Banerjee, Raghabendra Chattopadhyay, Esther Duflo, Daniel Keniston and Nina Singh

American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 2021, vol. 13, issue 1, 36-66

Abstract: Management matters for firms, but what practices are optimal in hierarchical government organizations? And can skilled managers identify them? A large-scale randomized trial conducted with the police of Rajasthan, India, tested four interventions recommended by senior police officers: limitations of transfers, rotation of duties and days off, increased community involvement, and on-duty training. Field experience motivated a fifth intervention: "decoy" visits by enumerators to register cases, incentivizing staff to improve service. Only training and decoy visits had robust impacts; others were poorly implemented and ineffective. Management reforms can improve policing, but even skilled leaders struggle to identify the optimal interventions.

JEL-codes: H76 J24 J45 K42 M53 O17 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (20)

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Working Paper: Improving Police Performance in Rajasthan, India: Experimental Evidence on Incentives, Managerial Autonomy and Training (2012) Downloads
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DOI: 10.1257/pol.20190664

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