Hurricanes, Climate Change Policies, and Electoral Accountability

Stefano Gagliarducci, M. Daniele Paserman and Eleonora Patacchini

American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 2026, vol. 18, issue 3, 135-62

Abstract: This paper studies the conditions under which legislators promote policies that may be unpopular in the short term but yield long-term benefits. Using data on the universe of federal disaster declarations from 1989 to 2020, we document that representatives from congressional districts impacted by hurricanes are more inclined to support environmental legislation addressing climate change. However, this response depends on political circumstances: Only those in safe seats can change their political agenda toward policies that involve short-term costs for long-term gains. These results highlight the role of electoral incentives in shaping politicians' attitudes toward farsighted policymaking.

JEL-codes: D72 Q54 Q58 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026
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DOI: 10.1257/pol.20230070

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