Perils of the Paperwork: The Impact of Information and Application Assistance on Social Benefit Take-Up in India
Sarika Gupta
American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 2026, vol. 18, issue 3, 342-71
Abstract:
Governments worldwide administer social programs for vulnerable groups, yet many eligible citizens fail to benefit. This paper studies barriers to take-up of an unconditional cash transfer program for poor women in Delhi, India, where only one-third of eligible individuals were enrolled. In a randomized experiment with eligible women, providing program information alone increased applications only among the literate. Adding basic or intensive application assistance, however, raised average application rates by 41 percent and 70 percent, respectively, and expanded access among more vulnerable women. These results suggest that application ordeals can limit take-up by those with high need.
JEL-codes: D83 I32 I38 J16 O15 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aea:aejpol:v:18:y:2026:i:3:p:342-71
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DOI: 10.1257/pol.20240212
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