Government Form and Public Spending: Theory and Evidence from US Municipalities

Stephen Coate and Brian Knight

American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 2011, vol. 3, issue 3, 82-112

Abstract: There are two main forms of government in US cities: council-manager and mayor-council. This paper develops a theory of fiscal policy determination under these two forms. The theory predicts that expected public spending will be lower under mayor-council but that either form of government could be favored by a majority of citizens. The latter prediction means that the theory is consistent with the coexistence of both government forms. Support for the former prediction is found in both a cross-sectional analysis and a panel analysis of changes in government form. (JEL H11, H72, R51)

JEL-codes: H11 H72 R51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
Note: DOI: 10.1257/pol.3.3.82
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (41)

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Working Paper: Government Form and Public Spending: Theory and Evidence from U.S. Municipalities (2009)
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