Targeting with Agents

Paul Niehaus, Antonia Atanassova, Marianne Bertrand and Sendhil Mullainathan

American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 2013, vol. 5, issue 1, 206-38

Abstract: Targeting assistance to the poor is a central problem in development. We study the problem of designing a proxy means test when the implementing agent is corruptible. Conditioning on more poverty indicators may worsen targeting in this environment because of a novel tradeoff between statistical accuracy and enforceability. We then test necessary conditions for this tradeoff using data on Below Poverty Line card allocation in India. Less eligible households pay larger bribes and are less likely to obtain cards, but widespread rule violations yield a de facto allocation much less progressive than the de jure one. Enforceability appears to matter. (JEL D12, I32, I38, O12, O15)

JEL-codes: D12 I32 I38 O12 O15 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
Note: DOI: 10.1257/pol.5.1.206
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (39)

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