A Test for the Rational Ignorance Hypothesis: Evidence from a Natural Experiment in Brazil

Fernanda Leite Lopez de Leon and Renata Rizzi

American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 2014, vol. 6, issue 4, 380-98

Abstract: This paper tests the rational ignorance hypothesis by Downs (1957). This theory predicts that people do not acquire costly information to educate their votes. We provide new estimates for the effect of voting participation by exploring the Brazilian dual voting system- voluntary and compulsory- whose exposure is determined by citizens' date of birth. Using a fuzzy RD approach and data from a self-collected survey, we find no impact of voting on individuals' political knowledge or information consumption. Our results corroborate Downs' predictions and refute the conjecture by Lijphart (1997) that compulsory voting stimulates civic education.

JEL-codes: D12 D72 D83 O12 O17 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
Note: DOI: 10.1257/pol.6.4.380
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (34)

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