Information and Communication in Organizations

Inga Deimen and Dezsoe Szalay

AEA Papers and Proceedings, 2019, vol. 109, 545-49

Abstract: We study a constrained information design problem in an organization. A designer chooses the information structure. A sender with preferences different from the decision-maker observes and processes the information before he communicates with the decision-maker. Information shapes conflicts within the organization: the optimal information structure essentially eliminates conflicts and serves as a substitute to the allocation of decision-making authority in the organization.

JEL-codes: D83 M10 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
Note: DOI: 10.1257/pandp.20191099
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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