Research Design with Weighted Lotteries in School Choice

Atila Abdulkadiroğlu and Inkoo Back

AEA Papers and Proceedings, 2024, vol. 114, 502-06

Abstract: Centralized admissions are an integral part of parental school choice programs. Most districts use a version of the deferred acceptance algorithm to assign applicants to schools. Centralized admissions produce data with quasi-experimental variation in student assignment that is integral in program evaluation. Recent developments in research design consider the basic version of the deferred acceptance algorithm. However, most districts adapt advanced versions of the deferred acceptance algorithm to implement their diversity policy in admissions, such as favoring applicants from disadvantaged backgrounds in lottery tie-breaking. We develop research design for data from the deferred acceptance algorithm with weighted lotteries.

JEL-codes: H75 I21 I28 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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DOI: 10.1257/pandp.20241135

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