Strategic voting under proportional representation: A model with evidence from the Netherlands

Stan Veuger and Tim Ganser
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Tim Ganser: American Enterprise Institute

AEI Economic Perspectives, 2018

Abstract: Strategic voters construct expectations of coalitions and policy outcomes based on expected seat distributions and vote to maximize their expected utility from the implemented policy.

Keywords: voting; AEI Economic Perspectives; Netherlands; coalition (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: A (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
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