R&D Collaboration Networks in Mixed Oligopoly

Vasileios Zikos

No 6228, Coalition Theory Network Working Papers from Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)

Abstract: We develop a model of endogenous network formation in order to examine the incentives for R&D collaboration in a mixed oligopoly. Our analysis reveals that the complete network, where each firm collaborates with all others, is uniquely stable, industry-profit maximizing and efficient. This result is in contrast with earlier contributions in private oligopoly where under strong market rivalry a conflict between stable and efficient networks is likely to occur. A key finding of the paper is that state-owned enterprises may be used as policy instruments in tackling the potential conflict between individual and collective incentives for R&D collaboration.

Keywords: Research; and; Development/Tech; Change/Emerging; Technologies (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 31
Date: 2008-03
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Related works:
Journal Article: R&D Collaboration Networks in Mixed Oligopoly (2010)
Working Paper: R&D Collaboration Networks in Mixed Oligopoly (2008)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:feemct:6228

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.6228

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